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Abstract 
Recent contributions to the comparative political economy of East European capitalisms 
have found that a distinctive variety of capitalism emerged in some new EU member states. 
The new variety has been dubbed “dependent market economy” (DME). This paper makes 
several contributions to this literature. First, it marshals evidence to show that this 
institutional variety now includes the political economy of Romania, a case previously 
excluded from it. More importantly, this analysis also finds that earlier scholarship on 
dependent capitalism has failed to capture crucial mechanisms of dependence created by 
transnationalized finance. Third, the paper suggests that some of the arguments made in the 
existing scholarship on the interests of foreign capital with regard to domestic innovation 
and labor training need to be qualified. Finally, by showing reflexivity towards select 
critiques of the dependent market economy framework, the analysis proposes by this paper 
is a self-limited attempt to bridge the differences between the varieties of capitalism and 
Polanyian analyses of capitalist diversity in semi- peripheral middle-income states. 
Introduction 
In the big picture of economic development during the past two decades, the European 
Union’s new member states are often associated with fast and deep liberalizations 
(Gowan 1999; der Pijl 2001; Peck et al 2010; Farkas 2011). While neo-developmentalism 
shaped responses to globalization in Latin America, Asia or Russia (Khan and 
Christiansen 2010; Wengle 2012; Ban 2012), these European developing countries have 
played the liberal card instead. Yet this commonality conceals more than it reveals. The 
literature on capitalist diversity in Eastern Europe agrees that no homogenous “East 
European” variety of capitalism has emerged in this part of the EU. Instead, some 
economies replicated liberal or coordinated market economy patterns found in Western 
European or Asian liberal models, while others clustered around a specific institutional 
equilibrium called the dependent market economy (Lane 2005; Knell & Srholec, 2006; 
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2007; Mykhnenko, 2007; Birch and Mykhenko 2009; Nolke and Vliegenthart 2009; 
Hancke 2012). The picture gets even more nuances once state and politics are brought in 
via a Polanyian analysis (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). 
	  
This paper departs from the observation that the literature is unclear on whether the 
ongoing crisis has reinforced these countries’ institutional complementarities or whether it 
has hastened their pre-crisis liberalization. This is an important question for the varieties 
of capitalism (VoC) scholarship, a scholarly tradition that has a penchant for predicting 
institutional stability but also prides itself on explaining change (Hall and Gingerich 2009; 
Hall and Thelen 2009; Schmidt 2009; Thelen 2009; 2012; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; 
Jo Martin and Swank 2012). This gap gains a special valance in the context of the less 
settled institutional ecology of EU member states like the Baltic countries, Romania and 
Bulgaria. Unlike new member states that had liberalized earlier (Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic), these political economies have gone through massive transformations a 
decade after the end of state socialism. In all of them, incremental changes taking place 
throughout the late 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium effected major 
liberalizations, as Bohle and Greskovits’s recent tour de force shows (2012: 96-131; 182-
201; 227-237; 248-255). But since the transformation of these economies was still in flux 
at the beginning of the post-Lehman crisis, one could expect them to be more likely than 
the “old” EU member states and early East European reformers alike to convergence 
towards the liberal variety of capitalism found in the UK or Ireland. Indeed, given their 
more fluid institutional order and their weak position vis-à- vis international pressures to 
liberalize, these countries are the most likely candidates to confirm Streeck’s (2009; 2012) 
skepticism that the liberalization steamroller can be resisted. 
	  
Within this “most likely” universe of cases, the case of Romania is the most interesting. 
In the late 1990s this was the East European economy with the most remarkable degree of 
institutional incoherence originating in the frictions between domestic interest groups and 
external actors, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the IFIs. For example, at the 
time, the country had a weak state given to mercurial interventions that ranged 
between very liberal and very interventionist institutions. It also had mixed economy with 
a large public sector, privatization paradigms that hesitated between Anglo-Saxon and 
continental templates, weak employer associations and an activist but fragmented labor 
union movement that supported weak neo-corporatist institutions (Cernat 2006). The 
resulting institutional frictions made this “cocktail” variety of capitalism less competitive 
than the one used by its Western neighbors. 
	  
Yet the Romanian political economy saw a fast and deep transformation. Less than a 
decade later, powerful external and domestic integrationist forces moved this economic 
structure on the more liberal spectrum that lies between the “dependent market economy” 
model specific to East-Central Europe and the “(neo)liberal” one found in the Baltic States. 
Both these models rely on foreign capital as their main engine of growth. Yet 
while the former has been based around an institutional infrastructure meant to attract and 
maintain multinational firms, the latter’s institutions were much more neutral towards the 
corporate sector. This paper argues that as a result of these transformations Romania had 
consolidated a model of capitalism that depended on multinational financial and FDI 
flows and used both liberalization and interventionism to reinforce this dependence. As a 
result, Romania ended its experimentation with cocktail capitalism and joined the camp of 
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the dependent market economies represented by the likes of Poland, Slovakia or Hungary 
with results that were mixed at best. 
	  
This paper contributes to the literature on development and capitalist diversity in Eastern 
Europe in three ways. First, in addition to filling in the knowledge gap on the 
understudied case of Romania, it attempts to adjudicate and update the debate between the 
advocates of Romanian exceptionalism (Cernat 2006; Myant and Drahoukopil 2010) and 
those who see Romania as part of the neoliberal model typical of the Baltic states but with 
a weaker state (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Second, and more importantly, it goes 
beyond the case of Romania and refines the literature on dependent market economies by 
unearthing dimensions of economic dependence that had not been considered in the 
original framework of the dependent market economy developed by Nolke and 
Vliegenthart (2009). Finally, it suggests that some of the interests attributed by existing 
scholarship to the multinational sector operating the dependent market economy should 
be revisited. 
	  
The study is organized as follows: after placing the paper in the literature on varieties of 
capitalism, a short historical background of the political economy of Romania is introduced 
in the first empirical section; then, in section two, the paper delves in the main body of the 
analysis by looking at the sources of investment dependence and the export profile of the 
Romanian economy; the comparative analysis of Romanian educational, innovation and 
corporate governance systems is addressed in sections three, four and five respectively. 
	  
Capitalist Diversity in Eastern Europe 
	  
The state of the art 
	  
Soon after independence the Baltic countries have adapted the liberal market economy 
(LME): financialized corporate sectors, a service-oriented economy, minimal state 
intervention, deregulated and mostly firm-level industrial relations, thin safety nets, 
education and training focused on the acquisition of general skills. At the other end of the 
spectrum is Slovenia’s coordinated market economy (CME), with the state playing a key 
role in coordinating capital and labor, neo-corporatist industrial relations, a social- 
democratic welfare state, patient domestic capital for firms and dual system vocational 
education that delivered the specialized skills needed by Slovenia’s sophisticated industry 
(Feldmann 2006; Adam et al 2009; Crowley and Stanojevic 2011; Hubner 2011). 
	  
In between these two extremes stands East-Central Europe, whose variety of capitalism 
cannot be captured by the existing lexicon due to the transformation of their economies 
into competitive assembly platforms for multinational corporations. Nolke and Vliegenhart 
call this dependent market economy (DME), an institutional hybrid seen as a variant of 
Ben Schneider’s hierarchical market economy found in Latin America (Schneider 2009; 
Schneider and Soskice 2009). Its essence is a “specific type of comparative advantage that 
is not based on radical innovation (LMEs) or incremental innovation (CMEs), but rather on 
an assembly platform for semi-standardized industrial goods”(p. 679). Loaded with 
liberalizing tendencies, the DME model has a critical “nonliberal” nature as well. Its 
institutions provide not only for the efficiency of market actors, but also for their 
governance via a slew of institutional interventions orchestrated by the state which, despite 
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some variation among the DME countries themselves (Duman and Kurekova 2012) end up 
privileging foreign capital over domestic capital and labor. 
	  
To demonstrate the distinctiveness of the DME variety, Nolke and Vliegenthart identify 
four institutional complementarities. First, MNCs don’t get finance from domestic banks 
and run insider governance networks, as in the CME mode. Neither do they access finance 
on international markets and open themselves up to outside control by shareholders, as it 
is the case in the LME variety. Instead, “mother” companies control the subsidiaries in a 
hierarchical fashion and get finance from the same sources as the “mother” banks. In this 
way both finance and governance highlight the dependency relationship. Second, to keep 
costs down, MNCs prefer low taxes, a medium level of deregulation in the labor market 
and firm-level collective bargaining. The likelihood of their success in pushing for this is 
high given that East European countries have economic institutions that depend on their 
competitive profile for foreign investors. 
 
Third, given that MNCs find it more efficient to transfer innovations to subsidiaries rather 
than invest in innovation-relevant skills or spend substantial amounts on vocational 
education schemes, as CME firms do. This dynamic is compounded by the fact that 
CME-style vocational education schemes require wide coordination between state, capital 
and labor, an institutional characteristic that has been minimized by the dominant 
postcommunist transition paradigm. As MNCs have avoided the kind of joint ventures 
demanded by developmentalist regimes in Asia, for example, the corporate headquarters 
of the “mother” firm can have a tight hierarchical control on innovation flows, thus 
trapping DMEs in a situation in which they remain assembly platforms for technologies 
developed by MNCs. Its institutional complementarities generate a comparative 
advantage in the assembly of manufactures of middle and high-levels of sophistication. 
	  
The case of Romanian capitalism 
	  
The state of the art on the case of Romanian capitalism is marked by the split between 
those who plead for Romanian exceptionalism and those who see Romania’s political 
economy as part of a neoliberal “Baltic-Balkan” model. Speaking for the first camp, 
Lucian Cernat’s excellent study provides an accurate picture of Romanian capitalism 
during the 1990s and finds it to be different from the more successful East-Central 
European and Baltic types (Cernat 2006). For all its merits, this study remains dated and 
can only be used as a benchmark for examining the starting point of the changes 
experienced by Romanian capitalism during the 2000s. Writing on the past decade, Nolke 
and Vliegenthart (2009) also see Romania as a country “stuck” in an underperforming 
cocktail capitalism. But the motivation of their rejection of Romania from the DME group 
is based on the Cernat study and a tangential piece of evidence (Bulgaria’s poor 
performance in complex exports).1  
 
1	  According	   to	  Noke	  and	  Vliegenthart,	  	  “while	   the	  ECE	  states	  have	  outperformed	  	  former	  CIS	  states	   such	  as	  Russia	  and	  Ukraine	   in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  development,	  	  their	  superior	   economic	   performance	  	  (particularly	  	  that	  of	  Slovakia)	   becomes	  most	  obvious	  when	  compared	   with	  Bulgaria	   or	  Romania.	   The	  DME	  model	  of	  Slovakia	   has	  been	  much	  more	  successful	   than	  the	  rather	   incoherent	   “cocktail	   capitalism”	   of	  Romania.	   This	  superior	   performance	  	  is	  also	  exemplified	   by	  the	  export	   share	  of	  complex,	   human-­‐-­‐-­‐capital	  intensive	   industries;	   from	  1996	  to	  2005	   it	  rose	  in	  Solvakia	   from	  41	  percent	   to	  51	  percent	  while	   it	  decreased	   in	  Bulgaria	   from	  31	  percent	   to	  23.	  Slovakia	   also	  reports	  rapid	  development	  	  in	  high-­‐-­‐-­‐tech	  exports	   from	  2003	  on.	  In	  contrast,	   the	  Bulgarian	   export	   structure	   has	  been	  relatively	  stable	  for	  the	  last	  five	  years,	  with	  some	  increase	  in	  heavy	  basic	  exports.”	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Similarly, Myant and Drahoukopil (2010; 2012) point to the export of simpler products as 
a reason for distinguishing Romania from Visegrad countries (Myant and Drahoukopil 
2010; 2012), Their evidence needs updating and refers to the share of FDI in the 
production of these goods, rather than their actual share in exports.In contrast to the 
literature on Romanian exceptionalism that draws on VOC, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) 
use a Polanyian conceptualization of capitalist diversity that stresses the role of the state. 
Their analysis suggests that Romania (and Bulgaria) have in fact converged on the 
(neo)liberal pattern seen in the Baltics. This leads them to talk about a “Baltic-Balkan” 
capitalism, albeit with the qualification that in Romania and Bulgaria governments’ 
attempts to the same were more circumscribed by weaker states and various forms of mass 
politics. These authors open a sophisticated discussion on postcommunist capitalist 
diversity that “grafts” select insights from VoC and classical political economy.2 Yet their 
analysis of Romania underestimates the extent to which its integration in European 
capitalism differs from the Baltic pattern in terms of the export share of complex industries 
and the role of state interventionism in attracting FDI. For example, while their claims 
about state weakness are correct, their assertion that FDI inflows in Romania went to low-
skill “sweatshop” industries and avoided complex manufacturing sectors (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012: 207) needs to be reexamined in the light of recent developments. 
	  
This paper is the first study since Lucian Cernat’s 2006 book that examines Romania in a 
systematic way. To this end, it uses primary evidence such as international financial media 
reports, Romanian public policy documents, analyses submitted by Romanian 
think-tanks and academics, interviews with key Romanian state and corporate actors 
carried out between 2008 and 2012, media reports and statistics issued by a wide 
diversity of actors inside as well as outside the country. The author also carried out 
interviews and recorded statements made by prominent policy makers and business 
leaders present at the Bucharest Forum, a top-level two-day seminar organized by the 
Aspen Institute in November 2012. 
	  
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper stays close to Nolke and Vliegenthart’s 
analytical framework while acknowledging its limitations and trying to reassess Bohle and 
Greskovits’ Polanyian analysis of Romania during the past decade. The paper agrees with 
those who argue the transplantation of varieties of capitalism to developing country 
contexts carries a great deal of problems. Chief among these is neglect of the politics of 
insertion in the global economy such as the dynamics of state capacity, political pluralism, 
the balance of class forces or the contingent choices of pivotal policy actors (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012; Ebenau 2012; Drahokoupil and Myant 2012; Bruff and Horn 2012; 
Heller et al 2009). Such aspects constituted the core of classical works on dependent 
development (Evans 1979; Cardoso and Faletto 1979) and have been reintegrated in some 
recent research (Kohli 2009; Beckert and Jager 2010; Bohle and Greskovits 2012). But 
while the DME framework is an incomplete one, it is nevertheless helpful at identifying 
some of the central mechanisms of dependent development for an open economy that 
Polanyians are interested in as well. For example, both schools of thought are interested in 
the extent to which states can attract complex industries or manage labor relations. 
	  
	  
	  2	  While	   I	  find	  Bohlee	   and	  Greskovits’s	  	  Polanyian	   plea	  to	  take	  the	  state	  seriously	   in	  discussions	   of	  capitalist	  diversity,	   for	  mundane	   considerations	  	  of	  word	  count	   I	  chose	   to	  leave	  out	  the	  complex	   analysis	   of	  state	  capacity	  that	  these	  authors	   undertake.	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By showing reflexivity towards select critiques of the DME framework, the analysis 
proposes by this paper can be read as a self-limited attempt to bridge the differences 
between the VoC and Polanyian analyses of capitalist diversity in middle income and 
semi-peripheral states. As such, while it leaves the systematic examination of critical 
aspects of the state’s balancing of market and society (e.g. the strength and weakness of 
the state, the politics of business interests or mass politics) to future research, this study 
flags specific historical junctures where they become most manifest and highlights the 
relevance of specific aspects of state weakness. 
	  
Background: From developmentalism to dependent development 
	  
Historically, proto-developmentalist ideas were popular in Romania since late 19th century 
but it was not until the right-wing authoritarian regimes that dominated Romania between 
1938 and 1944 that state-led development was carried out in policy practice (Ban 2011). 
The apex of this historical pattern was socialist developmentalism (1949- 
1989), which was for the most part a local adaptation of the Soviet model. In addition to 
the well-known characteristics of the latter it emphasized a closer financial, trade and 
technological relationship with Western Europe. When this model collapsed under the 
weight of a debt crisis in 1982, the Ceausescu regime shifted towards a less open 
economic regime geared towards the payment of foreign debt and the eventual 
accumulation of domestic development finance (Ban 2012). 
	  
The first few years of democracy saw the shift towards a Romanian synthesis of 
embedded neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism. Between mid 1990 and mid 1991 the 
country’s first democratically elected government initiated a massive drive to deregulate, 
privatize and liberalize the economy while striving to make large SOEs more competitive 
and craft neo-corporatist industrial relations in a difficult international environment 
marked by lack of access to international financial markets. This hybrid economic regime 
led to a transformational recession of unprecedented proportions in peacetime, leading to 
the collapse of the government. 
	  
The next five years were marked by the dirgiste part of the ex-communist party. It entailed 
a systematic attempt to institutionalize a more decisively heterodox neo- developmetalist 
regime constrained only by the temporary conditionalities of IFIs. Following 
macroeconomic stabilization and return to growth, the Vacaroiu government opted for an 
economic model based in macroeconomic activism and industrial policy targeted at big 
employers in the public sector and FDI investments situated at the medium and high level 
of industrial sophistication. Rather than aim for Baltic-style “bare” neoliberalism or 
Visegrad-style dependent capitalism, the main objective of this government was gradual 
transition to a neo-developmental policy regime in which the state, domestic capital and 
joint ventures with foreign manufacturing firms would balance each other out in a political 
economy where full employment remained a legitimate objective. This “transition neo-
developmentalism” took the country from recession to growth but failed to create the 
virtuous neo-corporatist and high redistribution cycles of Slovenia and was eventually 
ousted at the polls in late 1996. 
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After 1996, a center-right turn in electoral preferences and the shift of the ex-communist 
towards the Third Way ushered in an economically liberal shift in Romania’s political 
economy. A liberalization breakthrough undertaken by a new center right government with 
IMF assistance led to a second transformative recession and deindustrialization but had to 
be slowed down due to massive labor resistance. It was only once EU accession was 
secured and under a new ex-communist government committed to orthodox 
macroeconomic, trade, tax and welfare reforms that the economy saw a systemic 
transformation towards a dependent reindustrialization agenda. This transformation has 
been the result of over a decade of dramatic domestic and international reorganizations of 
the domestic institutional landscape. The economically liberal turn in Romanian politics 
after 1996 plunged the country into a deep recession whose effects were magnified by the 
Russian and East Asian crisis of 1998. After four years of reforms and labor strife that 
brought the government on the brink of declaring a state of emergency and put tanks in the 
streets, the signs of recovery remained weak. What saved the liberal project from its 
implosion was Romania’s EU integration, which began in 2000. The adoption of EU- 
mandated economic institutions and privatizations of the “pearls of the crown” (banks, 
utilities, energy, large manufacturing) as well the uncertainty-removing effects of the 
expected membership pumped 100 billion in the Romanian economy, quadrupled the 
country’s exports and arrested the process of deindustrialization. EU integration 
strengthened the hand of neoliberal reformers who found in the EU few limits on how far 
they could shrink state and social solidarity institutions. 
	  
This transformation was taken much further after 2004 by an ideologically radicalized 
liberal-conservative coalition. Under the Tariceanu and Boc governments (2005-2011) 
the neoliberal transformation of Romanian society and economy was taken away from the 
“embedded neoliberalism” of East-Central European countries countries and in the 
direction of libertarian experimentalism pioneered by the Baltic countries in the late 
1990s. By achieving growth rates higher than those of the trailblazers of liberalization 
(Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) throughout the 2000s, Romania’s dependent 
market economy model seemed vindicated. Yet by shrinking capital inflows and external 
demand while compressing domestic demand the Great Recession has called into question 
this model and left policymakers without robust means of intervention. 
	  
Dependent investment 
Nolke and Vliegenthart (2009) argue that one of the defining features of DMEs is that they 
are heavy importers of capital. In other words, the primary source of investment is FDI, not 
the stock market (LME) or domestic banks (CMEs). This characteristic gives DMEs a 
higher level of external dependence on foreign economic cycles than in LMEs or CMEs. 
Romania is no exception. As figure 1 shows, during the 2000s the Romanian economy 
began to converge with the DME profile along the basic indicators used by Nolke and 
Vliegenhart. Between 2002 and 2010 no less than 106 billion euros entered Romania, 
representing FDI and financial inflows, contributing to a threefold increase of the GDP. 
Specifically, from representing 10 percent of GDP in 2000, FDI grew to nearly half of it in 
2010 to the point that it plays a critical role in gross capital formation today. Basically for 
every billion of GDP growth, the economy received 1.4 billion in foreign investment. 
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   FDI inward 
stock as 
percentage of 
GDP (2010) 
FDI as 
percentage of 
gross capital 
formation 
(2008) 
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
as percentage 
of GDP (2008) 
Market 
capitalization of 
listed 
companies 
(2007) 
Hungary 71 22 69 35 
Czech R. 67 13 50 40 
Slovakia 58 20 44 8 
Poland 41.2 14 49 48 
Romania 43.9 20 45 26 
	  
	  
Sources: FDI inward stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (1990-2010), 
UNCTAD Communications and Information Unit, FDI/TNC database, viewed 11th 
August, 2011, <http://www.unctad.org/fdistatistics>; visualized at 
http://chartsbin.com/view/2271; for market capitalization see 
www.tradingeconomics.com; 
	  
To better understand the concrete implications of these figures, this section will unpack the 
importance of foreign capital by examining separately FDI and financial investments. The 
share of FDI in the export sector is a good proxy for external competitiveness while its role 
in the financial sector affects the availability of capital to small and medium firms in the 
economy. The analysis places Romania within the DME camp but with several 
qualifications. Most importantly, the section argues that there are two categories of DMEs: 
small export economies, where exports account for 80 percent of GDP (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary) and middle-sized economies, where they account for 30 to 
40 percent. Along with Poland, Romania fits the latter category. 
	  
Foreign direct investment and complex exports 
	  
The trade off between the dominant position of foreign capital and the capacity to harness 
FDI to increase the complexity of exports appears to be the fundamental characteristic of the 
DMEs (Nolke and Vliegenthart 2009) and “embedded neoliberal” regimes (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). While Romania did not fit this profile in the early 2000s it certainly did a 
decade later and, as such, it differs from the Baltic group with which Bohle and Greskovits 
associate it (2012: 223-237; 251-258). Multinationals churning out complex products gained 
a strong foothold in the economy and became the main engines of 
export-led growth. Like the average DME, Romania has a large share of industry in its 
GDP. Between 2004 and 2008 the growth of the turnover rate-or the total of all sales- in 
the manufacturing sector grew faster in Romania not only relative to the liberal Baltic 
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models, but also relative to all the other DMEs (Eurostat 2012). Energy, automotive, steel 
and chemicals dominate the top 50 firms by size.1 At 21 percent of GDP, the Romanian 
manufacturing sector’s share of the economy puts Romania in the same league with 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary, rather than with the less industrialized Baltic states or 
Bulgaria (World Bank 2012). 
	  
The transnationalization of the Romanian economy was the result of identifiable political 
decisions. Throughout the 2000s Romanian governments consciously followed the DMEs’ 
attempt to convert the core of the economy into an assembly platform for MNCs. This 
strategy was facilitated by the ascendancy of liberal economic ideas on both sides of the 
political spectrum and was strongly incentivized by chronic shortages of capital in the 
public sector and the weakness of domestic private capital (Ban 2011). The incorporation 
of Romania’s industrial economy into the assembly platforms of MNCs yielded immediate 
results. Arguably, the main drivers of the spectacular growth of the 2000s were the 
exceptionally fast catch-up in productivity enabled by foreign direct investment and 
integration into cross-border European production networks.3 In turn, these processes 
started a convergence process with the export-led DME economies. By the end of that 
decade, Austrian, German, French and Italian firms (in this order) accounted for about 
two thirds of Romania’s exports. By 2011, of the top 100 exporters, 96 were subsidiaries 
of multinationals. Thanks to such firms, exports boomed: compared to the 1990s, exports 
in 2010s were 600 percent larger. When austerity depressed domestic demand after 2010, 
growth projections were tied strictly to export dynamics (Canagarajah et al 2012). 
	  
Most importantly, my analysis challenges the popular thesis that Romania’s incorporation 
in the European economy is dominated by exports of low complexity. By 2012 Romania 
was no longer the low-end textiles-and-steel territory of the 1990s. The bulk of FDI was 
invested in energy, chemicals, means of transportation, industrial equipment, mining and 
steels. Manufacturing attracted most FDI (44 percent), as the low wage army of labor 
with solid engineering skills made possible by the modernist educational philosophy of 
Romanian socialism made possible a boom of Western investment in manufacturing, 
from cars to aircraft parts. International brands like Renault or Ford established some of 
their largest plants in Romania by purchasing off-the-shelf factories built during 
socialism but others (Continental, Nokia) built new ones. Textiles and footwear, the 
erstwhile export niche of the Romanian economy, received only 1.4 percent of FDI, three 
times less than the IT sector.4 Like in the DMEs and unlike in the Baltic countries, this 
outcome was as much the result of a decades-long experience with industrialization as of 
industrial policies targeted at multinationals that invested in activities of medium and 
high complexity. 
	  
In relative terms, this transformation makes Romanian exports quite similar to the DME 
model. In the ranking of export complexity done by MIT’s Economic Observatory, the 
level of complexity of Romanian exports has gone from a low level in the early 2000s to 
	  
	  3	  According	   to	  Eurostat,	   Romania	   had	  the	  highest	   productivity	  	  growth	   in	  the	  EU	  during	   the	  2000-­‐-­‐-­‐2011	  period.	  
4 Marin	  Pana,	   “A	  growth	   engine:	   FDI	  and	  their	  role	   in	  the	  economy	   from	  Roman	   to	  Boc/Un ”motor” de creștere: 
Investițiile străine și aportul lor la economie, de la Guvernul Roman la Guvernul Boc,	  Curs	  de	  Guvernare,	   September	  30,	  2012	  http://cursdeguvernare.ro/un-­‐-­‐-­‐%E2%80%9Dmotor%E2%80%9D-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐crestere-­‐-­‐-­‐investitiile-­‐-­‐-­‐straine-­‐-­‐-­‐in-­‐-­‐-­‐	  ultimii-­‐-­‐-­‐ani-­‐-­‐-­‐si-­‐-­‐-­‐aportul-­‐-­‐-­‐lor-­‐-­‐-­‐la-­‐-­‐-­‐economie-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐la-­‐-­‐-­‐guvernul-­‐-­‐-­‐roman-­‐-­‐-­‐la-­‐-­‐-­‐guvernul-­‐-­‐-­‐boc.html	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ranking close to the Netherland’s, lower that that of Hungary, the Czech Republic or 
Slovakia as well as higher not only relative to Bulgaria and the Baltics, but also than in 
Spain and Portugal.5  Within the DME world, Romania’s export profile is virtually 
indistinguishable from Poland in terms of their complexity. In contrast, the Baltic states and 
Bulgaria have export profiles that put them in the company of commodity exporters (Brazil, 
Canada), traditional low end manufacturing economies (Portugal) or war-ravaged 
economies (Lebanon, Serbia, Bosnia). 
	  
	  
Figure 1: What did Poland Export in 2010? 
 
	  
 
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
5 MIT,	  The	  Observatory	  	  of	  Economic	   Complexity,	   http://atlas.media.mit.edu/rankings/	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Figure 2: What did Romania export in 2010? 
 
 
During the 2000s, Romania also began to look more like Poland than the small export oriented 
economies of Slovakia, the Czech Republic or Hungary when it comes to the makeup of FDI 
flows: three times more investment went into commodities and banking than on complex 
products. Also, while migrant remittances play a minor role in DMEs (except Poland), they 
matter significantly in the Romania and Poland (Ban 2009).6 
	  
Like in the other DMEs, a wide array of Western firms that are pivotal suppliers for the 
global car industry opened up large operations in Romania. When Renault announced 
that it would open a large research and development facility close to Bucharest and began 
a hiring spree in the engineering departments of Romanian campuses, many felt that the 
developmental shift from assembling Western products to designing and manufacturing 
them locally was within reach. Moreover, even in the midst of the crisis, a wide survey of 
hundreds of investors found that IT, telecom, energy and pharmaceuticals were expected to 
be the substantial contributors to future growth and that Romania was perceived in investor 
circles as a country whose emerging competitiveness clusters signaled a high likelihood of 
more high-tech development.7 
	  
But the role of foreign capital should be further qualified by the fact that the state 
companies remain major contenders in some industrial sectors. Thirteen SOEs account 
for 20 percent of the turnover rate in the top 100 industrial firms and in terms of assets, 
six firms from the top ten are state-owned, with one state company (Hidroelectrica) 
	  
	  
6 Data	  processed	   by	  Myant	   and	  Drahoukopil	  	  (2012).	  
7 Ernst	  &	  Young,	   European	   Attractiveness	  	  Survey,	   2012,	  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Attractiveness_2012_europe/$FILE/Attractiveness_2012_europe.pdf 
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boasting assets worth 7 times more than the biggest multinational (Automobile Dacia 
Renault). In terms of net corporate profits, the Austrian-owned national oil company 
(Petrom) is followed by two state-owned energy companies, whose combined profits are 
almost as high as of the rest of companies in the top ten of Romanian corporations.8 
Finally, the most important two employers in the corporate sector are state-owned (mail 
and rail), with the national oil corporation owned by Austrian OMV and the 
internationally successful Dacia plant owned by Renault coming next. This situation is 
not unlike that of Poland (not to mention Slovenia), yet by 2013 many of these large state 
industrial operations were up for sale. 
	  
Very much like Hungary or Slovakia a decade before, during the 2000s Romania offered 
manufacturing FDI a genuine “competition state” whose weak capacity in providing 
modern infrastructure on a par with its regional competitors was matched by its willingness 
to subsidize the internationalization of Romania’s productive base through uncompetitive 
privatizations carried out at large discounts, tax breaks, subsidized energy or credit 
guarantees. State aid was coherently and competently managed and its terms were designed 
to target at multimillion dollar multinational investments with high multiplier effects and 
know-how trickle down. The biggest investments in the automotive sector (Renault, Ford, 
Delphi, Bosch, Draxlmaier, Honeywell, Pirelli), aircraft (Premium Aerotec), white goods 
(deLonghi), oil equipment (Lifkin), electronics (Nokia) and IT (IBM) were completed only 
following the granting of significant state subsidies.9 State aid schemes were further 
institutionalized after during the crisis through several emergency decrees. 10 
	  
Subsidies were important but the bulk of FDI-friendly interventions took place 
elsewhere. Rather than be carried out in the spirit of EU-advised competition, the 
privatization of utilities with West European capital offered instead opportunities for 
horizontal and vertical concentration (Haar and Marinescu 2011). Privatizations at 
discount prices were common. For example, the publicly-owned oil giant Petrom, the 
only east European oil company that sourced 75 percent of crude from domestic oil 
production, was sold in 2004 to Austrian-owned OMV at a woefully undervalued 
price.11 The Romanian boom in renewable energy was fueled by government-issued 
“green certificates” 12 and many greenfield investments were carried out only 
following land grants and the public provision of utilities and transportation 
infrastructure. Energy sold cheaply by state- owned hydropower and subsidized coal 
power stations benefited extensively foreign investments in energy-intensive 
industries like steel and aluminum.13 
	  
8 There	   is	  not	  a	  single	   firm	  owned	   by	  a	  private	   Romanian	   entity	   in	  top	  10.	  9	  Ministry	   of	  Finance,	   	  Lista agenţilor economici	   care	  au	  primit	   acorduri	   de	  finanţare	   emise	  de	  MFP	   în	  anul	  2012	  în	  temeiul	   H.G.	  nr.753/2008,	  	  până	   la	  data	  de	  21	  noiembrie	   2012,	  http://www.mfinante.ro/listafinantare.html?pagina=domenii	  10	  See	  H.G.	  753,	  1680	   (in	  2008)	   and	  797	  in	  2012.	  Available	   at	  http://www.mfinante.ro/listafinantare.html?pagina=domenii	  11	  The	  Romanian	   Intelligence	   Service	   informed	   the	  Parliament	   that	  the	  Romanian	   state	   lost	  nearly	   I	  billion	  dollars	   from	  the	  sale.	  SRI,	  Raport	   nr.	  1255,	  December	   8,	  2007.	  12	  Romania	   continues	   to	  be	  the	  world's	   10th	  most	  attractive	   destination	   for	  investments	  	  in	  wind	  power	  according	  to	  global	   financial	   consultancy	  	  Ernst	  &	  Young	   (Ernst	  &	  Young	  Country	   Attractiveness	  	  Index	  2013).	   See	  also	  “Winds	  of	  fortune	   blow	  through	   Romania”	   Financial	   Times,	  March	  16,	  2011.	  13	  “Romania	   May	  Have	  Given	  ArcelorMittal	  	  Unlawful	   State	  Aid”	  Bloomberg	   News,	   July	  6,	  2012,	  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-­‐-­‐-­‐07-­‐-­‐-­‐06/romania-­‐-­‐-­‐may-­‐-­‐-­‐have-­‐-­‐-­‐given-­‐-­‐-­‐arcelormittal-­‐-­‐-­‐unlawful-­‐-­‐-­‐state-­‐-­‐-­‐aid-­‐-­‐-­‐	  eu-­‐-­‐-­‐says	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The post-Lehman crisis highlighted the limits of dependent industrial investment. FDI 
dropped from an average of 6 billion a year to around 2 billion a year after 2009, while 
public debt increased by 400 percent between 2008 and 2011. Once removed the vast net 
of perks with which FDI was attracted, multinationals confronted the Romanian 
government and society with a rude awakening to the reality of disloyal capital. A few 
high employment multinationals cut down their operations as a result of falling demand in 
Western Europe. Others (Finnish Nokia and Russian Mechel) simply used up the FDI 
incentives and then swiftly moved out to economies with even lower wages. In late 2012 
foreign firms for whom subsidized power produced by state-owned hydro plants was a 
major reason for moving to Romania were considering moving out as well.14 Moreover, 
the fiscal crisis of the state forced out revelations that the oligopoly of five Western 
European energy companies saved 250 million euro by not investing in the modernization 
of the power grid infrastructure they purchased with a discount in 2005-08,15 often 
causing interruptions in the power supply.16 
	  
In short, during the past decade Romania has acquired some of the defining feature of the 
industrial sectors of DMEs and has done so largely through FDI-focused industrial policy 
measures and, as the next section shows, failure to act on the dependent status of its 
innovation systems. As the next section shows, Romania follows the DME pattern in 
finance as well. This is the result of the dominant position of the subsidiaries of foreign 
banks in the Romanian financial sector as a result of a particular mode of financial 
transnationalization that affected Eastern periphery differently than the Southern one. It is 
to the analysis of this issue that I now turn. 
	  
Dependent finance 
	  
If during the 2000s banks from the EU “core” banks made fortunes in Southern Europe 
largely through wholesale markets that boomed under the impetus of euro convergence 
(Gabor and Ban 2012), in Romania and Eastern Europe more generally they simply 
bought existing state-owned institutions. The results of the ensuing shopping spree were 
spectacular: the share of foreign-owned assets in total banking assets grew to 85 percent 
foreign ownership. While in 1998 five state-owned banks had 71 percent of banking 
assets, by 2008 the public banking sector had shrunk to 5.3 percent. Among the ten 
largest banks, only two (state owned CEC and privately owned Banca Transilvania) were 
domestic on the eve of the Lehman crisis. In contrast, in 2008 the subsidiaries of foreign 
banks had 89 percent of the market share. In the DME category, only the Czech Republic 
reported higher numbers.17 As a result, over 80 percent of credit originates from the 
Eurozone. 
 
 
	  
14 Interview	   with	  Doru	  Lionăchescu,	  	  consultant,	   Managing	   Partners,	   EvZ,	  http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/2012-­‐-­‐-­‐	  apogeul-­‐-­‐-­‐crizei-­‐-­‐-­‐Stlpii-­‐-­‐-­‐economiei-­‐-­‐-­‐prsesc-­‐-­‐-­‐Romnia-­‐-­‐-­‐1008417.html	  
15 Ziarul	  Financiar,	   February	   7,	  2012.	  Available	   at	   http://www.zf.ro/companii/cel-mai-important-proces-pentru-stat- 
electrica-cere-la-paris-penalitati-de-250-mil-euro-de-la-cez-enel-si-e-on-10550057 
16 Investigation	  	  report	   undertaken	  	  by	  the	  Commission	  	  for	  the	  Privatization	  	  and	  Management	  	  of	  State	  Assets,	   no	  816,	  May	  31,	  2010.	  On	  file	  with	   the	  author.	  17	  UniCredit	   Group,	   CEE	  Banking-­‐-­‐-­‐still	  the	  right	  bet,	   July	  2008,	  www.bankaustria.at/en/index.html
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The basic idea behind this transformation was that by selling their banks to brand names in 
Western banking the Eastern Europeans would shoot several rabbits with one shot: (a) 
break the links between government incumbents, state banks and state-owned enterprises 
responsible for cycles of non-performing loans, bank recapitalizations, and inflation (b) 
avoid the Russian and Ukrainian scenario in which local insiders would snap state banks 
for a song and build oligarchic business empires filled with bad politics (c) reduce the 
uncertainty of the EU membership negotiations by privileging buyers from the EU 
member state, (d) get a brand new off-the-shelf banking sector decked out with modern 
Western technologies and, most importantly, (d) address a decades old economic 
frustration of electorates-squeezed private consumption-by making consumer credit 
abundant and easy. Sensible people thought at the time that all this signaled international 
credibility, helped ease the Easterners from the EU waiting room into the boardroom and 
riveted the region’s financial systems with powerful banks that were too big to fail at 
home. 
	  
Most importantly, however, this transformation supplied governments with a strong 
economic source of domestic legitimacy. Consumption levels depressed by restrictive 
macroeconomic policies of dubious benefit for the economy as a whole (Gabor 2012) 
recovered. From a paltry 5 billion euro in 1999, private debt went up to 200 billion euro
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in 2009. As a result, overall debt increased five times, from 10 billion in 2000 to nearly 
50 billion in 2008. Since Lehman, the figure doubled, to nearly 100 billion in 2012.18 
	  
Dependent banking was a quick fix for the socio-political crisis of Romanian 
postcommunism, yet it failed to serve the Romanian economy well in the medium term. 
Like in the other DMEs, foreign ownership in the financial industry blew a huge 
consumer and real estate credit bubble while making only a marginal contribution to 
industrial investment or the small and medium enterprise sector. As Gabor (2012: 101- 
105) shows, lending to the firms in 2008 was as high as in the 1994-1996 period, when 
the banking sector was domestic and predominately state-owned. Far from supporting the 
local small and medium entrepreneurs, the transnationalized Romanian banking sector had 
only 15 percent of this sector of the economy on its books. Moreover, while in 2000 
industry received 56 percent of credit, by 2008 this share fell to 20 percent, outpaced by 
credit to households and the service sector. In contrast, in 2008 12 percent of credit was 
financing the construction sector. 
	  
As for MNCs, rather than get their finance from “local” banks, they brought their credit 
lines with them.19 By 2008, cross-border intra-company loans reached almost 14 percent 
of overall credit to corporations (Gabor 2012: 101). Also, since easy credit benefited 
mostly an emerging middle class (about 20 percent of the population by most estimates) 
whose consumption patterns stressed imports, the local subsidiaries of foreign banks 
assembled together the main engine of the East European crisis: gaping current account 
deficits (Voinea 2012). Moreover, foreign banks funded a massive increase in 
construction expenditures by becoming the originators of a mortgage lending in euros and 
other “hard” currencies, owing to the importance that the favorable interest rate 
differential played in the profit strategies of the foreign-owned banking sector.20 
	  
The banking crisis of 2008-2009 and the collapsing confidence of international direct 
investment after 2008 sheared Romania’s development model of its strengths. Indeed, 
while dependent development made Romania prone to FDI and portfolio investment 
booms on the upswing, it reversed them just as dramatically during the post-Lehman 
downswing. The result was a structural economic crisis that began as a banking crisis 
magnified by current account imbalances and followed by a dramatic cut of FDI inflows 
(Gabor 2009). Foreign banks that owned the financial sectors started to deleverage at 
home and considered pulling out to supply funds to mother banks hit by the Lehman 
crisis; the West European crisis depressed the optimism of foreign direct investors, 
leading them to abruptly cut investment flows to Romania; to boot, the countries where 
most Romanian remittances originated (Italy, Spain, Ireland) faced a dramatic surge in 
unemployment. With its coffers emptied by pro-cyclical tax cuts adopted before the crisis, 
the conservative government did not have ready resources to act countercyclically even in 
the unlikely ideological event that it wished to. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
18 Data	  supplied	   by	  the	  national	   Institute	   of	  Statistics	   (INS).	  19	  Interview	   with	  Sorin	  Mandrutescu,	  	  AmCham	   Romania,	   Bucharest,	   November	   2012;	   interview	   with	  Andrei	  Radulescu,	   stock	  broker,	   December	   2012.	  20	  Interview	   with	  Andrei	   Radulescu,	   Bucharest	   stock	  broker,	   December	   2012	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At this point the subsidiaries of foreign banks activated previously unexplored 
mechanisms of economic dependence that were bolstered by the EU and the IMF. First, in 
the fall of 2008 their treasury and currency desks have actively orchestrated speculative 
attacks against the Romanian Leu (Gabor 2009; 2013). Second, in early 2009 
that international banks reduced their cross-border loans to East European banks, with the 
greatest reductions affecting the most liquid of them (Slovakia and the Czech Republic), in 
a move that a BIS report termed as suggestive of the fact that “some parent banks may have 
temporarily used these markets to maintain liquidity at home” (Dubravko Mihalijek 
2009, p. 4). In relative terms, the reduction in cross-border banking flows as a percentage 
of GDP was about as big for ECE in 2008-2009 as it was for Asian countries in 1998- 
1999 (p.7). To alleviate the liquidity crunch, in 2009 central banks in Hungary, Poland 
and Romania tried to convince the ECB to broaden the list of eligible collateral for its 
monetary operations by including government bonds issued in local currency in exchange 
for haircuts to these non-euro government bonds. The ECB rejected the suggestions.21 
The panic of foreign banks who bought up local banks and now faced massive losses and 
the possibility of unbundling currency pegs was so great that 2008-9 many of them 
threatened to use the exist option, triggering fears that the ensuing capital outflow would 
shut down the economies of the region. The panic in early 2009 was so big that foreign 
banks were ready to overlook the fact that the Romanian lending market had a great 
potential: it was only worth around 40 per cent of GDP, whereas it’s 150 per cent 
elsewhere in the region.22 
	  
Third, in the specific conditions of the crisis of early 2009 the transnational banks 
constrained policy autonomy through joint international policy conditionality. This 
happened as the E.U. and the IMF intervened and orchestrated a massive bailout of the 
financial systems of Romania, Latvia, Hungary, Bosnia and Serbia. Ironically, it was in 
Vienna, the trigger of the Great Depression, where an agreement was signed in 2009 with 
banks, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the EBRD, the IMF and the 
states in question sitting around the table. The core of the agreement was that West 
European banks committed to stay if ECE governments reiterated commitments to austerity 
and stabilizing the banks’ balance sheets while the IMF and the E.U. put the corresponding 
bill (fiscal austerity, high interest rates, constraints on mortgagees’ rights, recapitalization 
I.M.F./E.U. loans deposited with the central bank) on the balance sheet of 
the states.23 
	  
The Vienna Agreement established a public-private international financial regime in which 
the IMF, the EU and the banks exercised a form of shared conditionality over the policy 
decisions of Romania, thus reinforcing the dependent status of its variety of capitalism. For 
the government, this meant reliable buyers of its bonds and a brake on the disorderly 
withdrawal of foreign banks. For the banks, it meant protection against the collapse in 
domestic demand made even more dramatic by the austerity included in the 
	  
	  
21 “And	   justice	   for	  all:	  in	  emerging	   Europe,”	   Financial	   Times,	  November	   7,	  2011.	  
22 Interview	   with	  Vlad	  Muscalu,	   economist	   at	  ING	  Romania,	   Financial	   Times,	   February	   13,	  2012.	  
23 It	  was	  no	  surprise	   then	  that	  as	  the	  West	  European	   sovereign	   debt	  crisis	  hit,	  another	  major	  vulnerability	  emerged:	   that	   foreign	   banks	   in	  Eastern	   Europe	   could	  become	   the	  transmission	  	  belts	   for	  the	  troubles	   of	  Western	  sovereigns.	   Following	   Greece’s	   tailspin	   and	  Austria’s	   downgrading	  	  in	  the	  spring	   of	  2012,	  S&P	  turned	  Romanian	  bonds	   into	   junk	  status	  because	   the	  Romanian	   banking	   sector	  had	  too	  much	  Greek	  and	  Austrian	   financial	   capital.	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bailout package. It also meant protection against constraining regulatory interventions 
(Kudrna and Gabor 2012) and the attempts made by consumer organizations in 2010 to 
lend erga omnis value to court rulings finding abusive clauses in bank contracts. Faced 
with the prospect of hundreds of millions of euros a year in loses,24 banks demanded and 
obtained IMF and central bank protection against Romanian courts.25 For now, the new 
crisis resolution regime institutionalized a transnational financial and macroeconomic 
policy dependence by keeping all Romanian governments committed to the Vienna 
agreement. 
	  
Third, the dependent status of Romanian capitalism has been further magnified by the 
workings of the sovereign-bank nexus afflicting the economies of Greece and Austria.26 
Romania is exposed to Greek banks, who control of sixth of assets in the banking sector, 
with each crisis in Athens having the largest Europe-wide repercussions on the Bucharest 
stock of exchange.27 Closer to home, in the summer of 2011 Greek subsidiaries in Romania 
used Emerging Europe interbank and swap markets to fund parent banks in Greece at the 
Romanian rate (6 percent), with rates in Greece being in the double digits.28 
	  
	  
Under pressure from a downgrade and without adequately consulting with the Romanian 
government, in 2011 the Austrian government recommended-or exerted “moral suasion” 
as Vienna put it- that Austrian banks limit their exposure in emerging Europe by calling 
them to issue loans not in excess of 110 percent of the financing they raise locally. This 
sent shockwaves in Bucharest,29 as according to Fitch Austrian banks own 31.5 percent of 
Romania’s bank assets. Faced with such problems the Commission and the IMF were less 
successful at extracting Vienna 2.0, a commitment for Western banks to maintain their 
commitments in Romania and the rest of the region.30 In response to Austrian and 
Greek troubles and despite the upbeat outlook on the economy, in November 2011 S&P 
downgraded Romania, a decision bolstered by the fact that foreign denominated debt 
exceeded 60 percent and foreign institutions owned 85 per cent of total banking sector 
	  
24 In	  2013	   the	  Romanian	   Banking	   Association	  	  (RBA),	   the	  financial	   sector	   lobby,	   estimated	   loses	  at	  600	  million	  euro	  a	  year	   in	  case	  new	  legislation	   allowed	   court	   rulings	   to	  have	  erga	  omnes	  power	   in	  cases	  where	   at	  issue	  were	  abusive	  contract	   clauses.	  Ziarul	  Financiar,	   November	   21,	  2012;	  http://www.zf.ro/banci-­‐-­‐-­‐si-­‐-­‐-­‐asigurari/ingrijorare-­‐-­‐-­‐	  printre-­‐-­‐-­‐bancheri-­‐-­‐-­‐privind-­‐-­‐-­‐intrarea-­‐-­‐-­‐in-­‐-­‐-­‐vigoare-­‐-­‐-­‐a-­‐-­‐-­‐codului-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐procedura-­‐-­‐-­‐civila-­‐-­‐-­‐arb-­‐-­‐-­‐roaga-­‐-­‐-­‐bnr-­‐-­‐-­‐sa-­‐-­‐-­‐intervina-­‐-­‐-­‐pentru-­‐-­‐-­‐	  ca-­‐-­‐-­‐bancile-­‐-­‐-­‐sa-­‐-­‐-­‐nu-­‐-­‐-­‐piarda-­‐-­‐-­‐sute-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐milioane-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐euro-­‐-­‐-­‐pe-­‐-­‐-­‐an-­‐-­‐-­‐10340113	  
25 The	  in-­‐-­‐-­‐house	  report	   of	  the	  RBA	  explicitly	   acknowledged	  	  the	  role	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  central	   bank	   in	  limiting	  court	   jurisdiction	  	  and	  regulatory	   moves	  deriving	   from	  court	   jurisprudence.	  	  Ziarul	  Financiar,	   November	   21,	  2012;	  http://www.zf.ro/banci-­‐-­‐-­‐si-­‐-­‐-­‐asigurari/ingrijorare-­‐-­‐-­‐printre-­‐-­‐-­‐bancheri-­‐-­‐-­‐privind-­‐-­‐-­‐intrarea-­‐-­‐-­‐in-­‐-­‐-­‐vigoare-­‐-­‐-­‐a-­‐-­‐-­‐codului-­‐-­‐-­‐	  de-­‐-­‐-­‐procedura-­‐-­‐-­‐civila-­‐-­‐-­‐arb-­‐-­‐-­‐roaga-­‐-­‐-­‐bnr-­‐-­‐-­‐sa-­‐-­‐-­‐intervina-­‐-­‐-­‐pentru-­‐-­‐-­‐ca-­‐-­‐-­‐bancile-­‐-­‐-­‐sa-­‐-­‐-­‐nu-­‐-­‐-­‐piarda-­‐-­‐-­‐sute-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐milioane-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐euro-­‐-­‐-­‐pe-­‐-­‐-­‐	  an-­‐-­‐-­‐10340113	  
26 According	   to	  Fitch,	  Austrian	   banks	  dominate	   Romanian	   banking,	   holding	   around	   40	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  market	  share,	  while	  Greek	  banks’	   subsidiaries	  	  account	   for	  24	  per	  cent	  of	  capital	   and	  14	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  assets	   of	  the	  banking	   sector.	  
27 “CEE:	  Bearing	   the	  brunt	  of	  the	  storm,”	  Financial	   Times,	  May	  14,	  2012.	  
28 “Honey,	   I	  shrunk	   Emerging	   Europe”	   Financial	   Times,	  November	   4,	  2011.	  
29 Romanian	   President	   Traian	  Basescu	   told	   foreign	   banks	   “You	  have	  made	  huge	  profits	   and	  if	  you	  are	  now	  getting	  ready	   to	  leave	  Romania	   unfinanced	   during	   the	  crisis	  we	  will	  think	   it	  is	  an	  act	  lacking	   fair	  play	  towards	  Romania	  (…)	  I	  don’t	  want	   to	  believe	  we	  will	  be	  left	  to	  pay	  the	  bills	  of	  banks’	   greed.	  There	  are	  European	  mechanisms.	  	  I	  urge	  you	  to	  use	  these	  mechanisms	  	  instead	   of	  choking	   the	  Romanian	   economy	   by	  reducing	   capital	  inflows.”	   Cited	  by	  
Reuters,	   November	   24,	  2011,	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/24/idUKL5E7MO18J20111124	  
30 Stefan	  Wagstyl,	   “Austria	   clarifies	   plan	   to	  curb	  eastward	   lending,”	   Financial	   Times,	   January	   17,	  2012	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assets. As Standard and Poors put it ‘these subsidiaries are autonomous from their parents, 
which we believe will likely limit spillover effects if confidence in the Greek banking 
sector weakens further. In our view, however, there is a risk that if foreign parent banks run 
into difficulties they may significantly reduce cross-border exposure to their subsidiaries, 
thereby reducing credit activity.” 31 The situation was potentially catastrophic. At the time 
Nomura estimated that foreign banks would suck 1.2 percent out of the Romanian GDP in 
the event of massive deleveraging, which was more than the 
total level of FDI in 2012. There was also a high risk of firesale, with no buyers in sight32 
and Basel III capital requirements looming large in the immediate future. 
	  
So far the paper showed how dependent industrial investment made Romanian exports 
more complex, placing the economy squarely in the DME camp. Yet the crisis brought to 
the fore the limits of reliance on FDI while the other DME characteristic (dependent 
finance) armed the mechanisms of the post-Lehman crisis in Romania and acted as a 
transmission belt for the sovereign debt crisis of the European periphery. What is more, the 
DMEs reliance on foreign capital for establishing strong domestic innovation systems able 
to generate domestic high value added activities experienced in the case of Romania one of 
its most disheartening manifestations. 
	  
Dependent innovation systems 
	  
Nolke and Vliegenhard argue that significant research and development (R and D) 
investments are not necessary in DME economies whose competitive advantage lies in the 
assembly of semistandardized goods. What matters is whether the economy has 
institutional complementarities that ensure profitability within MNCs with operations on 
the ground. In this perspective, the dynamics of domestic innovation capabilities is 
peripheral to the strategies of multinational capital. As such, dependent innovation 
systems represent an important development trap. Romania fits the DME profile quite 
well in this regard. Aside from a few industrial niches of excellence, Romania remains an 
assembly platform for innovations developed abroad. Indeed, to the extent that Romanian 
exports have become more complex and diversified, this had little to do with domestic R 
and D. There has also been very little technological trickle down from FDI flows. As in the 
case of the DME countries, FDI was focused on the use of local labor and government 
incentives, leaving R&D operations elsewhere. What is worse, domestic capital is even less 
likely to invest in innovation. The result is that in Romania private sector’s share of R and 
D spending is up to ten times less than in West European countries with a developed 
manufacturing sector like Austria or Sweden. 
	  
MNCs strategies did not foster much local innovation but what about the state? While 
state involvement in fostering innovation has been key in success stories from the US to 
Korea, in Romania the state has actively dismantled the extensive research infrastructure 
inherited from the years of socialist developmentalism and dramatically cut R and D 
spending. This is hardly a Romanian characteristic. While average R & D spending per 
GDP reaches 2 percent in the EU (with highs of 4 percent in Sweden an Finland), in 
	  
	  
31 “Romania:	   Junked	   by	  S&P.”	  Cited	   in	  Financial	   Times,	  November	   29,	  2011	  
32 Nomura	   and	  BIS	  data	  cited	   in	  Financial	   Times,	  November	   4,	  2011.	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Romania it is around 0.5 %, a level similar to that of Poland and Slovakia and half the 
level of Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
	  
Joining the EU altered this passive R and D policy and encouraged an increase in R and D 
spending. While the share of EU funds for R and D remained minuscule and the share of 
the private sector in the total R and D investment even declined between 2005 and 
2009, the share of the government budget spent on FDI nearly doubled between 2005 and 
2009, from 0.5 to 1 percent of the government budget, with universities picking up most 
of the increase in spending.33 This is not bad, when one thinks that as a share of GDP, 
public spending on R and D (aside from universities) was on a par with Sweden and 
Austria. Yet it was as a result of the EU-assisted austerity package adopted in 2010 that 
Romania became one of the three EU states that cut public R and D spending. The state 
worsened this outcome by refraining from using even those innovation policies that have 
been allowed by Brussels,34 such as public acquisitions of innovation-rich products. The 
state also failed to foster those institutional complementarities between academic research 
and industry that foster industrial applications. 
	  
Overall, Romania’s potential to improve its innovation dossier remains limited.35 But this 
owes as much to state weakness as to the strategies of the private sector. While more than 
half of R&D in the EU is made by private firms, in Romania this percentage is barely 23 
percent, with most R&D still originating in the public sector. Alternative sources of 
funding R and D are late in arriving. The Bucharest Stock of Exchange does not have the 
strength to promote equity finance or project finance on an adequate level.36 Venture 
capital for start-ups is scarce and, while improved government access to EU funds could 
address some of the shortfalls in public funding, progress has been elusive. Take the 
Capital Risk Fund, for example. This is an EU-funded government initiative that makes 
available 100 million euros for innovative start-ups whose actual operationalization has 
been blocked for over three years. In its next two budgets the government inaugurated in 
late 2008 plans to mobilize the competitiveness funds from the Ministry of the Economy 
to advance applied research in advanced technology sectors, an initiative that enjoys the 
support of the business community, yet skepticism reigns among innovating industries 
about the awareness of pivotal policy players about the importance of R and D. 
	  
The argument made popular by the reviewed literature that the Romanian state is too 
weak for industrial policies meant to upgrade local innovation systems needs to be 
qualified, however. During the past few years there emerged a few niches of excellence 
in Romanian industrial policy that the state could build on in the future. This is the case 
of innovation clusters in the auto and the IT sector, both of which benefited from 
extensive state aid and income tax cuts and exemptions. In IT, a sector that brings the 
state half a billion euro a year in tax receipts, industrial policy has been critical via 
	  
	  
33http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/science_technology_innovation/introduction	  
34 Steliana	   Sandu,	  Michael	   Dinges	   (2007):	  Monitoring	   and	  analysis	   of	  policies	   and	  publicfinancing	  	  instruments	  conducive	   to	  higher	   level	  of	  R&D	  investments.	  	  The	  “Policy	  Mix”	  Project:	   Country	   Review	  Romania,	   United	  Nations	   University,	   UNU-­‐-­‐-­‐MERIT,	  March.	  
35 It	  is	  interesting	   some	  of	  the	  greatest	   fortunes	   (over	  a	  billion	   euros)	   have	  been	  made	  by	  domestic	   IT	  entrepreneurs	  	  http://www.capital.ro/detalii-­‐-­‐-­‐articole/stiri/173417.html	  
36 Interview	   with	  Vincenzo	   Calla,	  BNP	  Paribas,	   November	   8,	  2012.	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income tax exceptions for the country’s 16,000 software programmers. It took extreme 
duress exercised by the European Commission to convince the government to start 
considering phasing them out gradually in 2013. This is a sector that ensures full 
employment: all graduates of computer science departments find work in their field, and 
this has remained so during the crisis.37 
	  
Although it accounts for an important part of exports and high-skill employment, the IT 
sector emerged as a homegrown industry and benefited from foreign capital inflows only 
from 2004 onwards. Benefiting from a unique set of skills in the region (software 
engineers with sophisticated polyglot and IT skills) and large classes of computer 
engineers from the country’s public universities, this innovation-heavy sector has 
recently attracted the likes of Oracle, Microsoft and so on. There is also a homegrown 
industry in the development of smartphones and tablets whose business strategy is to 
import them from China and load them with more competitive software with sales in the 
hundreds of thousands.38Also, some of the wealthiest Romanians are IT entrepreneurs. In 
2012 a new government began to budget for adequate finance for start-ups and the 
coordination of private sector and university research capabilities.39 
	  
The other example is automotive research, a sector of strategic importance for the 
comparative advantage of all DMEs (Haiss et al 2009). Renault set of one of its biggest 
research centers and received extensive state financial support to this end.40 Built with local 
firms, managed largely by Romanian managers and hiring thousands of engineers, Renault 
Technologie Roumanie (RTG) has design, testing and engineering platforms in three cities. 
This 450 million euro research center is the biggest of a major European carmaker outside 
of Europe and some of Renault’s 2012 new models were designed to a great extent in 
Romania.41 RTG hires engineering students after training and testing them in internships, 
with no less than 700 young engineering students taking up this opportunity. The center 
received from the government 70 million in subsidies as well as government guarantees for 
a 100 million loan during the 2008-2011 period. In short, Romania not only assembles 
around one million cars a year, but is developing the capacity to design them. Renault is 
not alone. Continental (tires and auto parts), Siemens (railway), Alcatel-Lucent (telecom 
and software), Intel (software), GlaxoSmithKline (pharma), Oracle (software) and Ina 
Schaeffer (ball bearings) have also spent tens of millions of euros on new R and D centers 
and hired thousands of engineers there (Dudian 2011). 
	  
These are encouraging niches but given the weakness of private sector financing of R and 
D, the state has to intervene in a significant way. In order to reach the pledge of 2 percent 
of GDP by 2020 the government has to contribute to processes that would make possible 
	  
37 Ziarul	  Financiar,	   November	   19,	  2012.	  
38http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/tech_and_it/Anul_gadgeturilor_romanesti_allview_evolio_infotouch_ebod	  a_0_810519212.html#	  
39 Interview	   with	  Sorin	  Mandrutescu,	  	  chairman	   of	  the	  American	   Chamber	   of	  Commerce,	   November	   8,	  2012	  
40 Renault	   Technologie	  	  Roumanie	   has	  design,	   testing	   and	  engineering	  	  platforms	   in	  three	  cities	  and	  received	   from	  the	  government	  	  30	  million	   in	  subsidies	   as	  well	  as	  government	  	  guarantees	   for	  a	  100	  million	   loan	  during	   the	  2008-­‐-­‐-­‐2011	  period.	  Capital,	   Seotember	   27,	  2011,	  http://www.capital.ro/detalii-­‐-­‐-­‐articole/stiri/renault-­‐-­‐-­‐urmeaza-­‐-­‐-­‐	  sa-­‐-­‐-­‐primeasca-­‐-­‐-­‐ultima-­‐-­‐-­‐transa-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐ajutor-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐stat-­‐-­‐-­‐pentru-­‐-­‐-­‐centrul-­‐-­‐-­‐de-­‐-­‐-­‐la-­‐-­‐-­‐titu-­‐-­‐-­‐153620.html	  
41 Renault	   Technologie	  	  Roumanie,	   www.renault-­‐-­‐-­‐technologie-­‐-­‐-­‐roumanie.com	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3,000 new research posts a year and a seven-fold increase in R&D spending by the 
private sector.42 For this to happen, Romanian politicians and state managers should 
perhaps embrace the developmentalist lessons offered by all industrialized countries 
about the quintessential importance of the state in providing innovation finance (Lin 
2011; Janeway 2012). The FDI-driven Romanian export miracle has not landed this 
economies on the high-octane development path of postwar Finland, Austria or, closer to 
home, the recent experiences of Singapore, South Korea or Brazil. In these countries, the 
integration into global supply chains involved making an ideal range of domestically 
designed products compete in world markets against Western household names. But for 
that to happen it is not enough to create the macroeconomic, regulatory and infrastructure 
enticement for foreign investors. One also needs intelligent industrial policies, patient 
public finance and bold and well-funded public-private partnerships in R&D that will 
integrate FDI into medium and long-term development targets defined by the 
government. Unfortunately, with the possible exception of the Czech Republic, DME 
reformers either rejected such policies with anti-government fervor or, following the 
policy fashions of the day, saw them as items of mothballed policy paradigms. The result 
is that the industrial future of the region looks more like that of Mexico’s maquiladoras 
than that of the Finnish or Korean industrial powerhouses. 
	  
Education and training systems 
	  
While institutional reforms point in the direction of an aspiration towards the CME model 
in Romania, the reality of education and training points towards a clear DME pattern. 
This section shows that advanced CME institutions that regulate continuous vocational 
education are not supported by adequate funding from either the state or corporations. 
Moreover, the results of a recent reform creating CME-style vocational education are yet 
to produce results. 
	  
During the 2000s the Romanian government established institutions that mandated and 
created incentives for continuous vocational education within the framework of collective 
bargaining. As a result, vocational training by firms became tax-exempt and firms were 
expected by the law to provide regular training to their staff.43 This regulatory 
environment was hardly evidence of an arms’ length take of the government on workers’ 
skills. Instead, it showed determination to constrain firms to invest in training.44 What is 
	  
42 Statement	   by	  Rolanda	   Predescu,	   a	  director	   at	  the	  government	  	  agency	   in	  charge	   o	  R	  and	  D	  (the	  National	  Authority	   for	  Scientific	   Research),	   http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/romania-­‐-­‐-­‐calls-­‐-­‐-­‐private-­‐-­‐-­‐sector-­‐-­‐-­‐hel-­‐-­‐-­‐news-­‐-­‐-­‐	  494820	  
43 Firms	  with	  more	   than	  20	  employees	   are	  bound	  by	  law	  to	  prepare	   and	  provide,	   every	  year,	   in	  agreement	   with	  the	  trade	  union	  or	  the	  employees’	   representatives,	  vocational	   training	   schemes,	   which	   are	  attached	   to	  the	  collective	   agreement	   at	  company	   level,	  as	  an	  integral	   part	  thereof.	   Employers	   are	  also	  supposed	   to	  create	   the	  appropriate	  	  conditions	   for	  all	  their	  employees	   to	  take	  part	   in	  vocational	   training	   programs	   at	  least	  once	  every	  2	  years,	   if	  they	  employ	   21	  or	  more	  employees	   or	  at	  least	  once	  every	  3	  years,	   if	  they	  employ	   21	  employees	   or	  less	  (Chivu	  2009).	  
44 Government	  	  Decision	   no.	  875/2005	   stated	   that:	   ‘Continuous	  	  vocational	   training	   (CVT)	   is	  not	  properly	  supported	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  	  industry,	   with	   the	  exception	   of	  the	  big	  corporations,	  	  particularly	   the	  multinational	  ones.’	  A	  national	   survey	   conducted	   in	  2000	  revealed	   that,	   in	  1999,	  before	   the	  massive	   influx	  of	  FDI,	  Romanian	   companies	  had	  allocated	   only	  0.5%	  of	  the	  personnel	   costs	   to	  continuous	   vocational	   training.	   A	  May	  2004	  exploratory	   survey	   demanded	   by	  the	  EU	  revealed	   low	  firm-­‐-­‐-­‐level	  investments	  	  in	  training	   and	  that	  only	  a	  fourth	  of	  the	  surveyed	   firms	  actually	   organized	   training	   programs,	   and	  even	   those	  who	  did	  saw	  them	  as	  expenditure	  	  demanded	   by	  law	  rather	   than	  as	  investment	   in	  human	   resources.	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more, amendments to the labor code adopted in the mid 2000s demanded that employers 
and unions establish vocational education training boards and centers meant to address the 
actual needs of companies and workers and license the vocational training staff. As a 
result, the number of training programs increased fourfold in a single year. The all- 
encompassing national collective contract for 2007-2010 stipulated that vocational 
training was mandatory and enforceable.45 
	  
Before the Lehman moment, it seemed that the government and social partners were 
moving towards more coordination, although good intentions were not matched with 
adequate funding for covering the retraining of the unemployed.46 The moves towards 
more coordination were terminated by the structural reforms adopted in the aftermath of 
the crisis. At the request of an alliance of organized SMEs and multinational capital, 
supported by the IMF, national collective bargaining and the panoply of continuous 
vocational education institutions that came with it were terminated. Like its neo 
corporatism, Romania’s continuous vocational education was largely a story of fleeting 
gains. 
	  
Vocational education for new workers has an more marked DME face. The skill 
revolution carried out by socialism proved to be a major asset for East European 
economies under capitalism and Romania was no exception. One of the legacies of 
socialist developmentalism in this country was a dual education system attached to 
specific industries (Ban 2012). But after 1989 budget cutbacks, poor reform designs and, 
most importantly, the halving of industrial labor was tantamount to vocational schools 
with obsolete equipment, a decimated staff and the transformation of these educational 
institutions into sites of social stigma. 
	  
Faced with this situation, governments embraced the then conventional wisdom about the 
obsolescence of vocational education. A 2003 reform extended the vocational school time 
to five years (a year longer than in regular high schools) and stressed the study of 
theoretical disciplines required by the high school graduation exam (bacalaureat). This 
loaded the already academically weak vocational school students with more tasks than 
students in high schools. To boot, practical skill cultivation was squeezed from 2 days a 
week to a few hours. Despite complaining about the shrinking pool of skilled blue-collar 
workers as a result of mass migration (Ban 2012),47 the private sector was late to 
mobilize to demand changes. Moreover, no longer did vocational school students face 
	  
	  
45 The	  agreement	   stipulated	   that	  when	   the	  employer	   fails	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  obligation	   to	  provide	   the	  funds	   for	  the	  vocational	   training	   of	  an	  employee,	   such	  employee	   ’is	  entitled	   to	  a	  paid	   leave	  of	  up	  to	  10	  working	   days	  or	  up	  to	  80	  working	   hours,	   for	  vocational	   training	   purposes.’	  
46 On	  5	  February	   2008,	   the	  trade	  unions	   submitted	   to	  the	  government	  	  a	  proposal	   for	  subsidies	   to	  be	  allocated	  from	  the	  unemployment	  	  fund	  for	  on-­‐-­‐-­‐the-­‐-­‐-­‐job	  training,	   and	  for	  a	  supplemental	  	  amount	   to	  the	  budget	   of	  the	  government	  	  labor	  agency	   budget	   for	  vocational	   training	   policies,	   arguing	   that,	  with	  the	  current	   budget,	   this	  agency	   cannot	   provide	   for	  the	  vocational	   training	   of	  more	   than	  3,000-­‐-­‐-­‐4,000	  employees,	   while	   the	  demand	   is	  for	  some	  2	  million	  workers.	  
47 Elvira	  Şeptelean	   “Romanian	   Vocational	   System:	   A	  New	  Beginning/Invatamantul	  professional	  	  din	  Romania:	   Un	  nou	  inceput”	   The	  Romanian	   Teachers’	   Association,	  	  August	   8,	  2012,	    http://www.asociatia- 
profesorilor.ro/invatamantul-profesional-din-romania-un-nou-inceput.html;	  author	   interview	   with	  Florin	  Pogonaru,	  president	   of	  AOAR,	   one	  of	  the	  most	  dynamic	   employer	   associations,	  	  July	  9	  2006.	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restrictions to take the bacalaureat and university entrance exams. As a result, vocational 
school ended up providing de facto general education within a time frame judged necessary 
for the academically challenged to take the bacalaureat. The denouement was inevitable: 
enrollment dropped dramatically and only a third of the students managed to graduate. In 
acknowledgement of system failure, the government dismantled vocational schools 
altogether in 2009. The result of these transformations was skill mismatch and 
the massive de-skilling of precisely the range of workers where Romania’s comparative 
advantage was at its highest: mid-level manufacturing. 48 
	  
The Great Recession seems to have triggered a reevaluation of vocational education, 
however. Nolke and Vliegenthart argue that foreign investors do not have incentives to 
demand training investments from the state, as the labor they use needs a very modest 
level of skills. This is not my finding in the case if Romania. Faced with skilled labor 
shortages, main organizations of foreign capital (AmCham and the Foreign Investors’ 
Council) made the reintroduction of vocational education their main priority. 49 Their 
move was successful and in 2012 vocational education was reintroduced, with the 
German model inspiring the new law and German multinationals spearheading the 
transformation. By law, employers now play a key role in deciding the number of seats, 
student training and then employment for this two-year educational system. Indeed, the 
number of seats is to be determined based on employers’ needs and students sign 
contracts with specific firms. Most of the curriculum is practical and does not allow 
sitting for the bacalaureat. Vocational students can take the bacalaureat only of they 
decide to transfer to a high school. To incentivize attendance, a special chapter in the 
budget was earmarked for scholarships to all vocational school students. 
	  
The 2012 reform looks promising. 13,000 students enrolled in 473 vocational schools 
and, reflecting the overall structure of labor demand, in the fall of 2012 most seats were 
in engineering.50 In the same year engineering departments in universities enrolled 
130,000 students, with 10,000 in IT alone. Foreign firms in some economic clusters such 
as Brasov and Timisoara, both dominated by German manufacturing capital, established 
their own vocational schools, with students also receiving a scholarship from the firms 
involved on top of the one received from the government.51 Today, the multinational 
sector began to emphasize vocational education and continues to push towards an even 
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deeper involvement of corporations in training. In 2012, the influential AmCham 
suggested amendments to existing legislation by suggesting that employer organizations 
send visiting teachers in schools, the introduction of IT education beginning with the 
kindergarten level, universal access to computers in all schools, mandatory training 
sessions in firms on a yearly basis, different rules for research and teaching colleges.52 
	  
So far the paper showed how on the brink of the 2008 crisis Romanian capitalism 
developed a new institutional equilibrium between the banking sector, manufacturing, 
innovation and training systems that brought it largely in the line with the DME pattern 
that Nolke and Vliegenthart observed in East-Central Europe. But rather than disrupt this 
equilibrium, the post-Lehman crisis reinforced its features, with vocational education 
being the only notable exception. When the 2011 structural reforms of labor market 
institutions also terminated Romania’s neo-corporatist industrial relations and 
institutionalized liberal industrial relations, convergence with the DME pattern was 
virtually complete. 
	  
Industrial relations 
	  
Once a heartland of postcommunist labor militancy and then budding neo-corporatism, 
during the Great Recession industrial relations in Romania have reinforced the institutional 
complementarity specific to both DMEs and LMEs: mid-level regulation and 
predominantly firm-level collective bargaining. Given the high perceived political costs 
of labor resistance, it took the extreme economic and political circumstances provided by 
the Great Recession for an emerging alliance between state and organized multinational 
capital to bring Romanian industrial relations in line with those of its regional competitors.  
The labor deregulation blitzkrieg undertaken in 2011 is a case in which the crisis enhanced 
the political power resources of liberalizing actors, enabling them to overpower the neo-
corporatist coalition between domestic labor and capital that defended the unionized sphere 
of the labor market against commodification. 
	  
Since the adoption in 2003 of pro-worker labor legislation (Trif 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008), a 
move aimed at re-embedding labor market exchanges in society, conservative 
politicians and domestic small businesses organizations have reinforced the demands of 
the IMF, the World Bank and multinational capital’s organizations (Federation of Foreign 
Investors and American Chamber of Commerce) that this legislation be scrapped and 
replaced with best practices endorsed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Opposing this 
position were all labor unions, the bulk of domestic employer associations and the left wing 
of the Social-Democratic Party, under whose government the pro-worker legislation had 
been adopted. 
	  
Before 2011, labor market deregulation had a story of failures in Romania. It had become 
part of IMF conditionality in 2004 and was eventually supported by an exiting Social 
Democratic government whose resolve was weakened by the existence of a strong liberal 
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faction and fear that a failed relationship with the IMF could negatively affect Romania’s 
application for EU membership. In 2004 the Fund demanded that a World Bank- 
approved international expert draft the new code and asked the government to adopt the 
new code during the term of the stand-by agreement with Romania. The advent of a 
conservative government in 2005 whose economic ideology stressed economically 
libertarian themes strengthened this pro-deregulation coalition and in its first month in 
office the new government announced that it would adopt the World Bank-approved 
legislation. 
	  
Yet the coordinated action of labor unions, their capacity to mobilize external support 
from West European unions and particularly the credibility of union threats ensured by 
the memory of extensive labor militancy during the 1990s (Munteanu 2003) made the 
government adopt a much more moderate labor reform in 2006, with union consent (Pilat 
2008). The mass migration of the labor force in EU member states in the late 2000s and 
the subsequent drying up of excess labor further weakened the case for the kind of “big 
bang” deregulation that the liberal coalition of domestic and external interests wanted. 
	  
In their brief analysis of Romania and Bulgaria during the crisis, Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012: 252) argue that in contrast to the Baltic countries, during the post-Lehman crisis 
the governments of these two states were “drifting and inconsequential in their policy 
responses and have been frequently challenged by massive protests waves.” At least 
when it comes to industrial relations in Romania this claim needs updating. For despite 
labor protests and, at least initially, the protestations of the biggest domestic employer 
organizations, in 2011 the conservative government of Emil Boc used an emergency 
procedure in the Parliament to undertake the most extensive deregulation of Romanian 
industrial relations ever recorded. Collective bargaining legislation was drastically 
changed: national level bargaining was eliminated, labor-capital relations are now limited 
largely to the firm level, union representatives lost their protections, firing became easy 
and temporary contracts and work conditions were freed from union intervention 
procedures (Domnisoru 2012). A new left-of-center government elected in November 
2012 on a wave of popular resentment against austerity and structural reforms has 
offered no evidence that the 2011 labor reforms stand to be reversed, thus locking 
Romania in the DME model on this front as well. 
	  
Conclusions 
	  
This paper suggests that there is overwhelming evidence to argue that Romanian 
capitalism has converged with the dependent market economy model detected by 
scholars in East-Central Europe. Like Poland, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, 
Romania has an economy dependent on FDI and financial flows that entails a significant 
degree of state-business coordination while excluding labor. These movements of capital 
made possible its economic boom during the 2000s, caused sharp increases in 
productivity and export complexity, slowed down the pace of deindustrialization and 
carved out niches of industrial excellence. In contrast to the Baltics’ radical skepticism 
about industrial policy, Romanian governments adopted a consistent set of FDI-oriented 
industrial policies that have experienced further reinforcement since 2008. But Romania 
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also replicated the other face of the DME model: a financial system largely divorced 
from the export industries, poor domestic innovation capabilities and low investments in 
the education and skills of domestic labor. Similarly, alliances between state and foreign 
capital removed peak level collective bargaining and a pro-worker labor code, two 
institutional pillars that had made Romania less rather than more DME-like. This 
development is significant in the light of Streeck’s Polanyian plea (2012: 36-37) that 
after the crisis the comparative study of capitalism should assign a more prominent place 
to conflict and contradiction in addition to and probably prior to cooperation and 
coordination. 
	  
Yet the paper’s findings reach beyond the case of Romania by tracking down 
mechanisms of dependence that do not appear in existing research and by qualifying 
some of its insights. Most of the new aspects of dependence can be found in the banking 
sector. Daniela Gabor’s remark that Romania is a “dependent financialized economy” is 
both apt and potentially applicable to other DMEs (Gabor 2012). When the crisis struck, 
the subsidiaries of foreign banks that controlled the financial sector had both the 
incentives and the capacity to execute a run on the Romanian currency. Moreover, they 
threatened to help their “mother banks,” draining a large part of the country’s money 
supply. In exchange for these banks’ maintaining their exposure, the Romanian 
government accepted an international public-private crisis resolution regime managed by 
the IMF and the EU that co-opted the banks in the mechanisms of policy surveillance. In 
this way, foreign banks added a new layer of dependence than the ones identified in the 
literature. Finally, the same public-private international regime successfully protected the 
subsidiaries of foreign banks against domestic regulatory interventions and consumer 
group campaigns. Constrained by an internationally monitored fiscal consolidation 
package, with its money supply sold to transnational banks periodically shattered by 
sovereign debt downgrades in their states of origin and faced with a massive collapse of 
FDI, Romanian governments had dwindling resources to make domestic capitalism less 
dependent even if they had the capacity and the ideological proclivity to do so. For 
reasons that future research has to clarify, they had neither of these. 
	  
The paper also qualifies some of the findings of the literature on dependent market 
economies. The argument that MNCs have no incentives to invest in local innovation 
systems is supported by evidence overall but it needs to be qualified by an analysis of the 
automotive and IT sector, This analysis suggests that MNCs can be made to do so 
through smartly targeted industrial policies. Similarly, the lack of interest of MNCs in 
vocational education posited in the literature appears challenged by the case of Romania. 
The paper’s findings suggest that labor shortages in a low-wage but increasingly complex 
export-oriented industry spurred MNCs to invest resources in vocational education 
reform. Given the emergence of such shortages in the other aging societies from the 
region, this development may become a new DME feature 
	  
In a broader sense, the paper’s findings may contribute to ongoing debates on the divide 
between neo-developmental and liberal economic models. Unlike in the case of open 
economy neo-developmental states (Ban 2012), in Romania’s dependent capitalism the 
state has an uneven capacity to create synergies between FDI, national development goals 
and the competitiveness of domestic capital. Furthermore, unlike in the case of post- 
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Soviet developmental states, where state-oligarch bargains were centralized and systemic 
(Wengle 2012), in Romania the state’s accommodation of the interests of domestic 
capital has been done in a fashion that was too ad-hoc and too decentralized to establish 
solid domestic anchors for improved employment, growth and global competitiveness. 
	  
Future analyses of the dynamic of East European capitalisms during the crisis can 
benefit from Polanyians’ insight that the social integration necessary for securing a 
functioning economy can be at odds with the profitable efficiency of the institutions that 
capitalists may be able to construct voluntarily for their own benefit. This means a better 
balance between attention paid to production regime (stressed by VOC) and the political 
regimes governing capitalism. This means that the literature on capitalist diversity may 
need a 
new continuum between Martin and Thelen’s (2007) emphasis on the role of politics in 
the coordination of capitalist economies and Streeck’s (2012) demand that politics 
should be construed more broadly than the supply of institutions geared towards more 
efficient and competitive production. 
	  
	  
	  
Bibliography 
	  
Adam, Frane, Primovz Kristan, and Matevvz Tomvsivc. 2009. “Varieties of Capitalism in 
Eastern Europe (with Special Emphasis on Estonia and Slovenia).” Communist 
and Post-communist Studies 42 (1): 65–81. 
 
Ban, C. 2011. “Neoliberalism in Translation: Economic Ideas and Reforms in Spain and 
Romania.” http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/11456. 
 
Ban, Cornel. 2012. “Brazil’s Liberal Neo-developmentalism: New Paradigm or Edited 
Orthodoxy?” Review of International Political Economy: 1–34. 
doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.660183. 
 
2012. "Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change The Case of Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s  Romania." East European Politics & Societies 26.4 (2012): 743--‐ 
776. 
 
Becker, Joachim, and Johannes Jäger. 2010. “Development Trajectories in the Crisis in 
Europe.” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 18 (1):5–27. 
 
Birch, K., and V. Mykhnenko. 2009. “Varieties of Neoliberalism? Restructuring in Large 
Industrially Dependent Regions Across Western and Eastern Europe.” Journal of 
Economic Geography 9 (3): 355–380. 
 
Bohle, D., and B. Greskovits. 2012. Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Bruff, Ian, and Laura Horn. 2012. “Varieties of Capitalism in Crisis?” Competition 
& Change 16 (3): 161–168. doi:10.1179/1024529412Z.00000000011. 
	   28	  
 
Canagarajah, Sudharshan, Martin Brownbridge, Anca Paliu, and Ionut Dumitru. 2012. 
“The Challenges to Long Run Fiscal Sustainability in Romania”. SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 1979288. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1979288. 
 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependency and Development in 
Latin America. University of California Press. 
Cernat, Lucien. 2006. Europeanization, Varieties of Capitalism and Economic 
Performance in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Crowley, Stephen, and Miroslav Stanojević. 2011. “Varieties of Capitalism, Power 
Resources, and Historical Legacies: Explaining the Slovenian Exception.” Politics 
& Society 39 (2): 268–295. 
 
Van Der Pijl, Kees. 2001. “From Gorbachev to Kosovo: Atlantic Rivalries and the Re- 
incorporation of Eastern Europe.” Review of International Political Economy 8 (2): 
275–310. 
 
Domnisoru, C. 2012. “Decent work policy options for the Romanian economy.” No. 
472564. International Labour Organization. 
 
Drahokoupil, Jan, and Martin Myant. 2012. “Putting Comparative Capitalism Research 
in Its Place: Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Economies, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
2055200, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2055200. 
 
Drechsler, W., R. Kattel, and E. Reinert. 2011. Techno-economic Paradigms: Essays in 
Honour of Carlota Perez. Anthem Press. 1hB&sig=uTPAC2Os1dgZgxIyD7Sap6kXgkE. 
 
Dudian, M. 2011. “Innovative Clusters: The Case Of Romania.” Management Research 
and Practice 3 (3): 1–11. 
 
Duman, Anil, and Lucia Kureková. 2012. “The Role of State in Development of Socio- 
economic Models in Hungary and Slovakia: The Case of Industrial Policy.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 19 (8): 1207–1228. 
 
Ebenau, Matthias. 2012. “Varieties of Capitalism or Dependency? A Critique of the 
VoC Approach for Latin America.” Competition & Change 16 (3): 206–223. 
 
Farkas, Beáta. 2011. “The Central and Eastern European Model of Capitalism.” 
Post- Communist Economies 23 (1): 15–34. 
 
Feldmann, Magnus. 2006. “Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Countries 
Industrial Relations and Wage Bargaining in Estonia and Slovenia.” Comparative 
Political Studies 39 (7): 829–854. 
 
	   29	  
Gabor, D. 2010. “(De) Financialization and Crisis in Eastern Europe.” Competition & 
Change 14 (3-4): 3–4. 
 
Gabor, D. V. 2012. “The Road to Financialization in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Early Policies and Politics of Stabilizing Transition.” Review of Political 
Economy 24 (2): 227–249. 
 
Gabor, D, 2012. “The Financialization of the Romanian Economy.” FESSUD report.  
Gabor, Daniela, and Zdenek Kudrna. "Political risk, crisis and foreign--‐owned banks in 
New Member states." Europe Asia Studies (2012). 
 
Haar, Laura N., and Nicolae Marinescu. 2011. “Energy Policy and European Utilities’ 
Strategy: Lessons from the Liberalisation and Privatisation of the Energy Sector in 
Romania.” Energy Policy 39 (5) (May): 2245–2255. 
 
Haiss, Peter, Bernhard Mahlberg, and Michael Molling. 2011. “The Automotive Industry 
in Central and Eastern Europe – Engine of Grow or Free Rider?” SSRN Scholarly Paper 
ID 1805968. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1805968. 
 
Hall, P. A., and D. W. Gingerich. 2009. “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis.” British 
Journal of Political Science 39 (3): 449–482. 
 
Hall, P. A., and D. W. Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Wiley Online Library. 
 
Hall, P. A., and K. Thelen. 2009. “Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism.” 
Socio-Economic Review 7 (1): 7–34. 
 
Heidenreich, Martin. 2012. Innovation and Institutional Embeddedness of Multinational 
Companies. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Hübner, Kurt. 2011. “Baltic Tigers: The Limits of Unfettered Liberalization.” Journal of 
Baltic Studies 42 (1): 81–90. 
 
Khan, Shahrukh Rafi, and Jens Christiansen. 2010. Towards New 
Developmentalism: Market as Means Rather Than Master. Vol. 83. Routledge. 
 
Knell, M., and M. Srholec. 2006. “Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe.” Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries. 
http://www.economicpolicy.eu/KnellSrholec2005Emergingvarietiesofcapitalismin 
CEE.pdf. 
 
———. 2007. “Diverging Pathways in Central and Eastern Europe.” Varieties of 
Capitalism in Post-communist Countries: 40–62. 
	   30	  
 
Kohli, Atul. 2009. “Nationalist Versus Dependent Capitalist Development: 
Alternate Pathways of Asia and Latin America in a Globalized World.” Studies in 
Comparative International Development (SCID) 44 (4): 386–410. 
 
Lane, D. 2005. “Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Former State Socialist Societies.” 
Competition & Change 9 (3): 227–247. 
 
Lin, J. Y. 2011. “New Structural Economics: a Framework for Rethinking Development.” 
The World Bank Research Observer 26 (2): 193–221. 
Martin, Cathie Jo, and Duane Swank. 2012. The Political Construction of Business 
Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality. Cambridge University Press. Myant, M., 
and J. Drahokoupil. 2010. “Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Economies.” 
Available at SSRN 1561944. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561944. 
 
———. 2012. “International Integration, Varieties of Capitalism and Resilience to 
Crisis in Transition Economies.” Europe-Asia Studies 64 (1): 1–33. 
 
Mykhnenko, V. 2005. “What Type of Capitalism in Post-communist Europe? Poland and 
Ukraine Compared.” In ESEMK Workshop on Forms of Capitalism in Central 
and Eastern European Countries in Transition, 4th March. 
http://www.policy.hu/mykhnenko/What_Type_of_Capitalism_in_Eastern_Europe 
_Draft.pdf. 
 
Nölke, A., and A. Vliegenthart. 2009. “Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe.” World 
Politics 61 (4): 670–702. 
 
Nousios, Petros, Henk Overbeek, and Andreas Tsolakis. 2012. Globalisation and 
European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International 
Relations. Routledge. 
 
Onaran, Özlem. 2011. “From Transition Crisis to the Global Crisis: Twenty Years of 
Capitalism and Labour in the Central and Eastern EU New Member States.” 
Capital & Class 35 (2) (June 1): 213–231. doi:10.1177/0309816811402648. 
 
Peck, Jamie, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner. 2010. “Postneoliberalism and Its 
Malcontents.” Antipode 41 (s1): 94–116. 
 
Pilat, Ninucia-Maria. 2006. “Trade Unions and the Amendment of the Labour Code in 
Romania.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 7 (2): 185–203. 
 
Schmidt, V. A. 2009. “Putting the Political Back into Political Economy by Bringing the 
State Back in yet Again,” World Politics 61 (3): 516–546. 
	   31	  
Schneider, Ben Ross. 2009. “Hierarchical Market Economies and Varieties of Capitalism 
in Latin America.” Journal of Latin American Studies 41 (3): 553–575. 
 
Schneider, Ben Ross, and David Soskice. 2009. “Inequality in Developed Countries and 
Latin America: Coordinated, Liberal and Hierarchical Systems.” Economy and 
Society 38 (1): 17–52. 
 
Sokol, Martin. 2001. “Central and Eastern Europe a Decade After the Fall of State- 
socialism: Regional Dimensions of Transition Processes.” Regional Studies 35 (7): 
645–655. 
 
Thelen, K. 2012. “Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New 
Politics of Social Solidarity.” Annual Review of Political Science 15: 137–159. 
Trif, A. 2004. “Overview of Industrial Relations in Romania.” SEER-South-East Europe 
Review for Labour and Social Affairs (02): 43. 
 
———. 2005. “Collective Bargaining Practices in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence 
from Romania”. MPIfG working paper. https://opus.zbw- 
kiel.de/dspace/handle/10419/41657. 
 
———. 2007. “Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from 
Romania.” European Journal of Industrial Relations 13 (2): 237–256. 
 
———. 2008. “Opportunities and Challenges of EU Accession: Industrial Relations in 
Romania.” European Journal of Industrial Relations 14 (4): 461–478. 
 
Voinea, Liviu. 0. “Revisiting Crisis Generators in Romania and Other New EU Member 
States.” Review of International Political Economy: 1–30. 
doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.733315. 
 
Wengle, Susanne A. 2012a. “Post-Soviet Developmentalism and the Political Economy 
of Russia’s Electricity Sector Liberalization.” Studies in Comparative 
International Development (SCID): 1–40. 
 
